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JOHN M. DePOe, University of Iowa, and JAMES C. McGLOTHLIN, 
Ohio State University
Philosophical naturalism often threatens to eliminate theism as an unnec-
essary and undesirable hypothesis. The mind and its irreducible features 
were once considered a stronghold against such naturalistic elimination 
and reduction. Recently, naturalism has swept this area of philosophy, 
substituting naturalistic “cranes” for theistic “skyhooks,” to use Daniel 
Dennett’s terminology, pressing the point once again that theism is an 
unnecessary hypothesis. Many theists have been content to let naturalism 
occupy this territory. Some, however, have begun to reclaim the meta-
physics of mind and rationality from naturalism. Two recent books that 
take this route are Victor Reppert’s C. S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea (CSLDI) 
and Angus Menuge’s Agents Under Fire (AUF). In their own ways, Rep-
pert and Menuge argue that when it comes to some aspects of the mind, 
it is preferable, perhaps indispensable, to explain it by means of a meta-
physical “skyhook” rather than a mechanistic “crane.” Since both texts 
largely overlap in concentration, it is apropos to review them together. 
The main focus of Reppert’s book seeks to highlight and explicate C. S. 
Lewis’s argument from reason (AFR), an argument that contends that nat-
uralism undermines rationality. In addition, there is excellent historical 
material about Lewis that we unfortunately will not be discussing in this 
review. Menuge’s larger (but more tightly focused) book deals with cer-
tain denominations of naturalism more specifically. As the title suggests, 
Menuge is especially concerned with the philosophical consequences of 
naturalism for rationality, intentionality, and the theoretical framework 
of science. Both books intersect on the subject of naturalism’s perceived 
detrimental effects for rational thought. Reppert and Menuge both claim 
that the assumptions of naturalism undermine rational thought and thus 
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undermine naturalism itself, whereas theism provides a more consistent 
alternative for science and rationality.
Case Against Naturalism
Reppert and Menuge both offer critical arguments against naturalism 
by appealing to the philosophy of mind. Reppert’s criticisms are aimed 
broadly at naturalism with little distinction among its various denomina-
tions. In chapter 4 of CSLDI, this is made explicit by six different applica-
tions of modus tollens each of which take the following form:
(1) If naturalism is true, then not-X.
(2) X.
Therefore,
(3) Naturalism is false.
The six aspects of mind and rationality that Reppert substitutes for X are: 
intentional states of mind exist; thoughts and beliefs can be true or false; 
a mental event can cause another event by virtue of its propositional con-
tent; logical laws exist and are relevant to reasoning; a single, metaphysi-
cally unified entity exists, which acts rationally; human cognitive facul-
ties can be trusted to confer knowledge reliably. These six variations fall 
under the rubric of the AFR because in each case Reppert maintains that 
acknowledging the existence of rational inference implies the truth of the 
premise (p. 2). To abandon any one of the six substitution instances of X 
would in turn abandon rational inference itself. Consequently, naturalism 
is false because accepting naturalism entails the denial of rational infer-
ence, which is certainly more fundamental than naturalism itself.
Naturalists have two ways to block Reppert’s multifaceted AFR. One 
option is to deny that each substitution instance of X is necessary for ratio-
nal inference (as we know it) to exist. Essentially this strategy seeks to un-
dermine the strength of the second premise of the AFR. Except in extreme 
forms of naturalism (e.g., eliminative materialism), most naturalists will 
likely not argue this way. The second, more promising route for natural-
ists, denies the first premise of the AFR. Indeed, many naturalists attempt 
to “naturalize” many, if not all, of the aspects of rational inference that 
Reppert believes are incompatible with naturalism. While many naturalists 
hope to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality, truth, logical laws, 
and other aspects of rational inference, this approach saddles the naturalist 
with a tall order of prima facie non-natural entities to naturalize.
Reppert’s critical arguments against naturalism show much promise, 
though they provide only a skeleton of a case against naturalism that will 
require further detail in argumentation to substantiate. Often (but, impor-
tantly, not always) Reppert’s substantiation of the first premise in an AFR 
appeals to extreme materialist views such as eliminative materialism to 
make his point. Most contemporary naturalists, however, do not hold to 
these extreme views. For example, Reppert uses quotations from Paul and 
Patricia Churchland to establish that if naturalism is true, then thoughts 
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and beliefs cannot be true or false (CSLDI, pp. 76–78). Reppert may be cor-
rect to maintain that naturalism is incompatible with thoughts and beliefs 
having a determinate truth-value, but this would certainly come as news 
to many naturalists who are not eliminativists. Reppert’s arguments could 
be strengthened by demonstrating how the first premise of each AFR ap-
plies to naturalism generally, rather than only to certain extreme forms of 
materialism. Nonetheless, even when his case is not made explicit against, 
say, physical non-reductive mind-body functionalism, a little reflection on 
the line of argument provided by Reppert in defense of the premise in 
question can elucidate the difficulty inherent for any account of natural-
ism to account for the issue in question.
Reppert’s arguments, if nothing else, place the burden of proof on natu-
ralists to explain how naturalism coheres with the existence of rational 
inference. Like Reppert, we believe that naturalism is impoverished to 
meet such a tall order. Yet, this opinion is not shared among everyone 
(especially among the naturalists!), so there is room for more work to be 
done on the AFR. Most importantly, more arguments need to be brought 
to bear on the incompatibility of naturalism with the realities implied by 
the existence of rational inference. Reppert’s work in CSLDI is the first step 
of a much larger project, if the AFR is going to succeed at refuting the most 
sophisticated forms of naturalism.
Menuge’s criticisms of naturalism take a different approach than 
Reppert’s sweeping AFR that is aimed at all forms of naturalism. Menuge 
distinguishes between “Strong Agent Reduction” (SAR) and “Weak Agent 
Reduction” (WAR), and levels specific criticisms against the best represen-
tatives of each materialist theory. SAR is best represented by philosophers 
who eliminate personal agency. This has most notably been undertaken 
by the eliminativist program in the work of Paul and Patricia Churchland. 
WAR is the more common form of naturalism found in approaches like 
functionalism and Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance.
In chapter 2 of AUF, Menuge raises four objections to SAR. First is the 
“abstraction problem,” which aims to show that a complete neurophysi-
ological explanation of human actions is inadequate because it lacks the 
abstraction of human folk psychological states to explain the human be-
havior. Interestingly, Menuge employs arguments by Dennett to make this 
point against SAR. The second argument against SAR notes the inelim-
inable subjective point of view, which cannot be captured or reduced in 
a scientific, third-person perspective. Menuge calls this the “subjectivity 
problem.” On this point, Menuge relies heavily on arguments made by 
John Searle and Thomas Nagel, both of whom are noted as thoroughgo-
ing naturalists. The subjectivity problem is self-refuting for advocates of 
SAR because they cannot peel away the subjective point of view by which 
they attain scientific knowledge. “[Paul] Churchland’s whole mistake,” 
writes Menuge, “is that he thinks that the viewpoint of scientific theory 
can be used to establish conclusions independently of the presuppositions 
of adopting that viewpoint” (p. 40).
The third objection Menuge dubs “the ontological robustness problem,” 
which shows how SAR, if true, would entail the elimination of an ontol-
ogy—including logical, empirical, and theoretical postulates—that makes 
science possible. The fourth objection revisits the traditional problem of 
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incoherence for advocates of SAR. SAR seems incoherent because it elimi-
nates folk psychology, part of which includes the framework of beliefs and 
rationality. If the language of beliefs and reasons must be eliminated with 
folk psychology, then it seems one cannot assert the truth of eliminativ-
ism on the grounds of having true beliefs and sound reasons. The stan-
dard response given by the Churchlands is to point out that this objection 
assumes the very paradigm SAR intends to disprove. In other words, to 
object to SAR on the grounds that it fails to meet what is reasonable ac-
cording to folk psychology is question-begging. Menuge extends the in-
coherence objection to a new level by using the Gentzen logical system 
to illustrate what is incoherent about SAR. The point is not merely that it 
is incoherent according to a folk psychological analysis. Rather, it is that 
there is no rational ground left to stand on once one goes the route of SAR. 
Menuge notes, “No one will be persuaded to gouge out one’s intellectual 
eyes without a proven replacement that will restore something resembling 
mental vision” (pp. 48–49).
In chapter 3 of AUF, Menuge focuses his criticisms on WAR. First, he 
criticizes functionalism, raising standard criticisms such as the Chinese 
Room Argument and the disjunction problem. Menuge spends most of his 
criticisms in this chapter on Dennett’s intentional stance. Menuge finesses 
the abstraction, subjectivity, and incoherence problems he has already 
raised against SAR to apply to Dennett’s version of WAR. Then Menuge 
raises an original criticism to Dennett’s WAR, which he calls the “suffi-
ciency problem.” The sufficiency problem highlights Dennett’s ambigu-
ous faltering between “Minimalist Mother Nature” and “Hagiographical 
Mother Nature” to explain human intentionality. Minimalist Mother Na-
ture is a barebones account of naturalism that relies only on survival of 
the fittest and the laws of nature to account for biological life. According 
to Menuge, Dennett depicts Hagiographical Mother Nature as a natural 
process that has foresight and purpose to design biological life to specific 
ends. If Dennett relies on Minimalist Mother Nature to give humans the 
intentional stance, then he is appealing to an insufficient source for human 
intentionality. On the other hand, if Dennett appeals to Hagiographical 
Mother Nature, then he is proposing an intentional cause that needs just 
as much explaining as human intentionality. Here, Menuge elucidates a 
powerful and original objection against Dennett’s version of WAR. It is 
noteworthy that this sort of ambiguous invocation of “mother nature” to 
supply design and teleology frequently arises in the literature by natu-
ralists, and Menuge’s argument may have further uses than criticizing 
Dennett’s intentional stance.
The strength of Menuge’s approach is the specificity of his critical 
arguments. AUF advances the debate on critical points of eliminative 
materialism and Dennett’s intentional stance. By probing the details of 
specific theories, the reader walks away with a clear grasp of some of 
the fundamental problems with trying to account for agency via SAR 
and WAR. The weakness of this approach is that the scope of materialist 
accounts of agency, especially of WAR, cannot be fully considered. Even 
though Menuge notes that most materialists account for agency with 
functionalism, his criticisms of functionalism are fairly standard ones to 
which most functionalists have initial responses. This is not to say that 
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his criticisms of functionalism are worthless. Rather, this shows that the 
sweep of Menuge’s arguments against naturalism is only partial, even if 
it is substantial.
From here it is clear why AUF and CSLDI should be paired together. 
CSDLI sketches a basic program against naturalistic theories of the mind, 
while AUF exemplifies some of the specific criticisms of naturalized theo-
ries of mind that need to be addressed in order for the AFR to succeed. In 
this way, CSLDI and AUF can combine their strengths, while offsetting 
their weaknesses.
The Case for Theism
Reppert and Menuge are not content with only giving critical arguments 
against naturalism, though. Both proceed to give alternative answers 
that make better sense of rationality and science. Reppert calls the next 
stage in his argument ‘explanatory dualism.’ By this he means that while 
some events in nature can be explained in terms of purely mechanistic 
causes, the elements of rational inference cannot. Chapter 5 of CSLDI 
focuses upon three of these elements that he claims a ‘consistent’ natu-
ralism fails to account for without undermining itself. If all of these el-
ements are true, then “human beings possess rational powers that are 
impossible for beings whose actions are grounded entirely by the laws 
of physics” (p. 87).
Naturalists may try to rebut the AFR by claiming that evolution would 
select rationality over irrationality in order to give a species a better chance 
of survival. It seems plausible to believe that a species with a greater ratio 
of true beliefs would outlive a species with a lesser ratio. But Reppert right-
ly notes, “if a physical realm is causally closed, then it looks on the face of 
things as if it will go on its merry way regardless of what mental states ex-
ists, and if this is the case, then mental states simply do not matter with re-
spect to what events are caused in the physical world” (p. 89). For instance, 
a species might have a better chance to survive by not knowing the truth. 
Certain falsehoods might be more conducive to survival. Reppert contends 
that a consistent physicalism leads to the conclusion that there are no men-
tal states with propositional contents. The naturalist response usually tries 
to redefine intentionality with a dispositional account of what it is for a 
thought to be about something else. But Reppert notes that the naturalist is 
then committed to epiphenomenalism, the burden of explaining the causal 
efficacy of these dispositions by purely mechanistic laws.
The laws of logic are another element of rationality that Reppert claims 
the consistent naturalist cannot hold as true. For instance, positivists 
claimed that necessary truths must be strictly about the relation of ideas 
to one another. For if our knowledge of necessary truths were about the 
world, then it would be an utter mystery how we knew these truths. But 
if knowledge is only based upon experience, how can we have knowledge 
of something that is true in all possible worlds? Reppert answers, if God 
knows these necessary truths, and if he has created us, then he could have 
constructed us in such a way as to know these sorts of truth.
Reppert finds a third line of argument in the reliability of our ratio-
nal faculties. We seem to expect the world to follow some sort of rational 
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order. At the very minimum, we seem to follow some sort of principles 
in our building of knowledge. Yet we cannot be so sure that the world 
‘out there’ corresponds to these convictions if our faculties are only the 
result of naturalistic evolution. But theism, responds Reppert, makes per-
fect sense of this phenomenon. For if our faculties have been designed by 
God, then they should correspond to the world that he has made.
Reppert claims, “All of these lines of argument support the idea of a 
dualism of fundamental explanations, that is the idea that we cannot ex-
punge purposes from the basic level of explanation without radically un-
dermining the very scientific enterprise that provides the primary founda-
tion for philosophical naturalism” (p. 101). Unfortunately this conclusion 
is overstated. Reppert has shown naturalism to be insufficient, but teleol-
ogy does not follow as a result. He does temper this conclusion by admit-
ting that ‘explanatory dualism’ is consistent with idealism or pantheism 
as well.
Menuge covers much of the same sorts of arguments as Reppert, but 
in more explicit form. In chapter 6 of AUF Menuge argues in favor of two 
theses originally advanced by Alvin Plantinga. One, already pointed out 
by Reppert, is that evolutionary naturalism leads to epiphenomenalism. 
Menuge goes about defending this first thesis with two arguments from C. 
S. Lewis as well. The first argument Menuge calls the empirical argument. 
This argument grants that a creature’s (or computer’s) responses can be 
improved indefinitely. Yet this can be done without acquiring one rational 
thought. Menuge rightly wonders how one can simply add thought to 
an unthinking mechanism. The second argument he calls the conceptual 
argument. The idea is that “natural selection is conceptually incapable of 
generating rational thought as a result of major contrasts between the pro-
cess of natural selection and the process of reasoning” (p. 158). In other 
words, natural selection does not explain how we see inferences as correct. 
Nor does it even begin to explain our grasp of something like deductively 
valid reasoning. Both of these arguments lead Menuge to the conclusion 
that if epiphenomenalism is true, there is good reason to expect that our 
cognitive mechanisms are unreliable.
His second thesis is even stronger: even if epiphenomenalism can be 
overcome, it is still unlikely that our cognitive mechanisms are reliable. 
As discussed in Reppert, natural selection could have given us faculties 
that latch onto false beliefs, especially if these had better survival value. 
Menuge refers to this as psychological instrumentalism, the view that our 
beliefs can be useful without being true. And he argues that this is a far 
more probable state of affairs on a purely naturalistic account than psy-
chological realism, the view that our beliefs are (normally) useful because 
they are true. Furthermore, Menuge argues that psychological instrumen-
talism implies theoretical instrumentalism, the view that scientific theo-
ries are merely useful computational devices, which gives strong warrant 
that theories may be nothing more than useful fictions. The consequence 
for naturalism should be obvious.
Menuge puts forth that these self-defeating problems make theism a 
compelling and reasonable alternative. For instance, in theism reason is 
conceptualized as prior to nature. Our rationality is seen as an imper-
fect participation in divine rationality. Also, mathematical and logical 
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concepts can be endorsed as platonic entities. Theism also extends to our 
theory choices. Symmetry, simplicity, and beauty are recognized as indi-
cators of truth since they are characteristics of the Creator. The universe 
simply exemplifies these marks. In addition, theism gives a better general 
explanation of the reliability of cognitive mechanisms. If we are made in 
the image of a rational God who knows all truth, then psychological real-
ism is a much more plausible thesis than psychological instrumentalism. 
Menuge, like Reppert, correctly admits that the inadequacy of scientific 
materialism does not make theism the only alternative.
Chapter 7 of AUF gives a strong case for the legitimacy of design as a 
respectable scientific conception. Menuge has two main arguments here. 
One, granted that concepts (in themselves) exist, intentionality and design 
cannot be fictional concepts since their legitimacy is established by the 
very nature of concepts and their connection to the world. Worst case sce-
nario, to be confused is to have fictional concepts that are intentional men-
tal entities. To deny this is to deny concepts exist. Furthermore, Menuge 
contends that the existence of human preconceptions establishes the real-
ity of design. Since we plan to do things and follow through on them, this 
gives strong evidence that design is a causally efficacious category and 
thus something which science cannot ignore.
Menuge’s second argument seeks to give reasons for thinking that undi-
rected causes could not produce the capacity for directed causation. Since 
the causal nexus is not governed by norms of rationality, these norms can-
not arise from it. Menuge claims several times throughout the book that 
the most promising naturalistic accounts of intentionality succeed only 
in displacing norms. They never really show how things arise from the 
non-normative in the first place. Menuge concludes, “the only coherent 
explanation of contingent intentionality is the existence of some necessary 
being, an agent from whom all other intentionality derives but who does 
not require further explanation” (p. 179). Menuge admits that though this 
may be a good philosophical reply, it will not stand the scrutiny of being 
called a scientific explanation.
So Menuge tries to bolster this philosophic explanation by dealing with 
a further objection. The idea of “conception” is considered antiquated by 
some naturalists. Some naturalists claim that everything we need to say 
about the mind can be done in terms of information-bearing states or mes-
sages. Menuge believes that such explanations are more examples of relo-
cating the original problem. But a second line of response, and one that is 
a more scientific explanation for the legitimacy of design, is that the infor-
mation theoretic complexity of human cognition points to design. In this 
carefully articulated section, Menuge gives an application of Dembski’s 
recent work in complex specified information (CSI). Space disallows any 
depth here, but Menuge makes progress for the conclusion that CSI can 
only be accounted for by design. Either scientific materialism must accept 
its failure to explain intentionality and CSI, or it must explain them by 
abandoning materialism.
AUF’s last chapter discusses the interaction of Christian theism with sci-
ence. Rejecting Michael Ruse’s reductionistic account, Menuge construes 
that science and religion will both prosper when both are practiced with 
humility and a greater openness to a diversity of ideas.
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Again, it should be clear why AUF and CSLDI should be viewed in har-
mony. whereas CSDLI gives several sorts of reductio arguments and thus 
a general case for ‘explanatory dualism,’ AUF gives the theistic alternative 
in more concise philosophical and scientific outlines. Both texts serve as 
excellent complements to one another.
Conclusion
we have noted numerous strengths to both CSLDI and AUF. Moreover, 
we wish to stress that these two books serve as excellent models for what 
will hopefully be a continued philosophical criticism of naturalism’s abil-
ity to explain the mind. Despite these strengths, CSLDI and AUF only 
begin to scratch the surface of naturalistic accounts of the mind and ra-
tionality. In particular, if a case against naturalism is going to be made 
on the grounds of something like the AFR, theists need to evaluate the 
merits of many more naturalistic theories such as non-reductive func-
tionalism, a view that receives very little attention in either book, even 
though it is most likely the predominant naturalistic account of the mind 
among contemporary analytic philosophers. We mention these short-
comings not because Reppert and Menuge have done inadequate work. 
Rather, we believe that their work is an invitation for more likeminded 
theists to explore the failures of naturalism to explain the metaphysics 
of the mind. Perhaps CSLDI and AUF will lead a renaissance of Chris-
tian scholarship that brings the explanatory force of theism to bear on 
rationality and the philosophy of mind, while demonstrating the weak-
nesses of naturalism in the process. Arguably, this renaissance is already 
underway in the writings of William Hasker, J. P. Moreland, Alvin Plant-
inga, Richard Swinburne, Charles Taliaferro, and others who argue that 
theism provides a unique and compelling explanation of the mind with 
which naturalism cannot contend. If nothing else, CSLDI and AUF make 
an initial case for theism, while placing a remarkable burden of proof on 
naturalists. We recommend both of these books not only for the informa-
tion they convey, but also because we hope that more Christians will join 
in the project of reclaiming the philosophy of mind, which is modeled in 
CSLDI and AUF.
Mill on God: The Pervasiveness and elusiveness of Mill’s Religious Thought, by 
Alan P. F. Sell. Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004. Pp. 202, $29.95
ANDREW GUSTAFSON, Creighton University
I am thus one of the very few examples, in this country, 
of one who has, not thrown off religious belief, but never 
had it: I grew up in a negative state with regard to it.
J.S. Mill (cited by Sell, p. 6)
Alan Sell’s Mill on God fills an important gap in scholarship on Mill’s re-
ligious views. The fact that Sell brings with him Christian concerns and 
